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Dealing with Laundering in the
Swiss Art Market: New
Legislation and its Threats to
Honest Traders
Katie L. Steiner1
On January 1, 2016, new regulations took effect in
Switzerland that impact the country’s art market. The laws
aim to close channels for laundering money and illicit
antiquities within the art trade. Because the art market’s
opacity provides attractive conditions for launderers,
Switzerland’s new regulations introduce greater
transparency in transactions for high-value works of art
and in duty-free art-storage facilities, such as the Geneva
freeport. The Geneva warehouse serves an international
clientele of art collectors, who have traditionally stored
works of art in the facility anonymously and indefinitely,
without adverse tax consequences. The freeport provides
essential services for honest collectors who wish to protect
their holdings secretly and securely. In addition, the
freeports offer an ideal climate for an emerging class of art
investors, who buy and store works until they appreciate in
value. By requiring greater transparency within the Swiss
art market in an effort to curb illicit activity, the new
regulations threaten to undermine the conditions that
support the interests of legitimate art traders. Because
Switzerland introduced its regulations unilaterally, Swiss
art traders should advocate for self-regulation within the
international art market in order to level the competitive
playing field and preserve the conditions of confidentiality
that honest traders depend on.
1. J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland,
Ohio, May 2017; M.A., Art History, Williams College, Williamstown,
Massachusetts, May 2008; B.A., Art History and English, Case Western
Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, May 2006.
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I. Introduction
Switzerland is home to one of the world’s most robust art markets.2
It serves an international clientele of collectors and collecting
institutions by offering a broad range of amenities, including auction
houses, important sale venues, and secure art storage. The Swiss art
market, like the art market as a whole, has traditionally enjoyed little
governmental regulation.3 Recently, however, Switzerland has
introduced new measures to combat laundering opportunities in the art
trade. These efforts reflect broader international attempts to close
avenues for terrorist financing, as well as the trade in illicit cultural
2. Nadja Capus, Country Report: Combating Money Laundering in Switzerland,
in COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 114, 182 (Mark Pieth
& Gemma Aiolfi, eds., 2004).
3. See Toby Hill, The Art Market: Unregulated, Unscrupulous, and Worth
Billions, ARTLYST (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.artlyst.com/articles/the-art-
market-unregulated-unscrupulous-and-worth-billions
[https://perma.cc/5ZLM-QHLB] (“Apart from drugs, art is the biggest
unregulated market in the world.”).
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property.4 Yet Switzerland’s new regulations, in effect as of January 1,
2016, may give rise to a number of unintended consequences.5
Specifically, the measures threaten to undermine the valuable services
and favorable legal and economic conditions that allow the country’s
legitimate art market to thrive. In addition, Switzerland’s regulations
could drive art collectors—including innocent ones—to similar but less
controlled markets in other countries, thereby driving valuable business
away, while doing little to stem laundering practices in the art market
globally.6
This paper analyzes the delicate balance between curbing criminal
activity and protecting the interests of honest buyers, sellers, and
dealers in one of the world’s most important art markets. It examines
key aspects of the Swiss art trade, especially the role that secure,
confidential, and duty-free storage facilities play in maintaining the
market’s vibrancy. It argues that Switzerland’s new regulations, which
aim to combat laundering by requiring greater transparency in cash
transactions and storage warehouses, threaten to eliminate the
conditions of secrecy and confidentiality that are vital to legitimate art-
market actors. Finally, the paper proposes a way forward for the honest
traders in the Swiss art market who face competitive disadvantages and
diminished services in light of the legislation. By promoting self-
regulation within the international art trade, Swiss art dealers stand
the best chance of leveling the commercial playing field while curtailing
illegal activity and preserving the confidentiality on which many
collectors depend.
4. See Financial Action Task Force, Money Laundering Vulnerabilities of Free
Trade Zones, ¶ 7 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20vulnerabilities%20of%20Free
%20Trade%20Zones.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QZU-X92U] (“Free trade zones .
. . present a unique money laundering and terrorist financing threat.”).
5. Isabelle Eichenberger, Art: The New Frontier in the Fight Against Money
Laundering, SWISSINFO (June 1, 2015, 11:00 AM),
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/opaque-art_art--the-new-frontier-in-the-fight-
against-money-laundering/41461526 [https://perma.cc/6R5Y-3PMX]; Henri
Neuendorf, Switzerland’s Tough New Stance on Freeports Will Shake the Art
World, ARTNET (Nov. 19, 2015),
https://news.artnet.com/market/switzerland-freeport-regulations-367361
[https://perma.cc/5NKD-FW73].
6. Sophia Yan, Where the Rich Stash Their Toys, CNN MONEY (Apr. 8, 2014,
6:04 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/08/news/economy/freeports-art-
luxury/index.html?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/33R6-QCRN].
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II. The Value of the Swiss Art Market: Two Key
Features
A. Contemporary Art Sales
A brief survey of the Swiss art market’s distinguishing
characteristics, and its economic value in general, demonstrates the
high stakes involved in the country’s new anti-laundering legislation.
Switzerland plays a key role in the $75 billion global art market, ranking
among the world’s top five trading centers, along with France, England,
Germany, and the United States.7 Major auction houses, including
Christie’s and Sotheby’s,8 as well as numerous private dealers, operate
in Switzerland.9 The country plays its most publicized role in the art
market during Art Basel, the contemporary art fair staged in Basel each
June.10 The event has emerged as the world’s most important venue for
buyers and sellers of twentieth and twenty-first century art, attracting
284 galleries from 33 countries in 2015.11
B. Art Storage
Switzerland attracts foreign collectors not only because of major
events such as Art Basel, but also because of its political and financial
stability, which produce favorable conditions for buying and storing
valuable works of art.12 In fact, one commentator has posited that
“Switzerland’s most important role on the international art market is
probably as an interim depository for art objects.”13 Among the storage
options available to collectors are the so-called freeports, or duty-free
7. Capus, supra note 2, at 182; Eric Reguly, The Link Between Art and Money
Laundering, GLOBE AND MAIL (Sep. 4, 2015, 10:24 AM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-
business/european-business/economists-urge-tighter-regulations-to-curb-
money-laundering-in-art-market/article26217852/ [https://perma.cc/4E8R-
87ES] (providing the value of the global art market for 2014).
8. Salesrooms and Offices, CHRISTIE’S, http://christies.com/locations/
[https://perma.cc/964V-YTM6] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016); Locations,
SOTHEBY’S, http://www.sothebys.com/en/inside/locations-worldwide.html
[https://perma.cc/5SNE-VBFH] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
9. See Members, SWISS ASSOCIATION OF DEALERS IN ANTIQUES & ART,
http://swissarttrade.com/site_gb/mitglieder.html [https://perma.cc/32HP-
WZY8] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
10. The Show, ART BASEL, https://www.artbasel.com/basel/the-show
[https://perma.cc/Z3BL-AWLV] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
11. Eichenberger, supra note 5; Maximiliano Durón, Preview Art Basel 2015,
ARTNEWS (June 12, 2015, 10:02 AM),
http://www.artnews.com/2015/06/12/preview-art-basel-2015/
[https://perma.cc/775U-UBJM].
12. Eichenberger, supra note 5.
13. DIRK BOLL, ART FOR SALE: A CANDID VIEW OF THE ART MARKET 64 (2010).
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warehouses located in Geneva, Basel, Zurich, and Chiasso.14 Freeports
emerged in Switzerland in the mid-nineteenth century to provide
temporary storage for grain and other commodities in transit to a final
destination.15 Over time, the Geneva freeport has evolved to specialize
in storing art and other valuables, often for extended durations.16
1. Freeport Mechanics
The canton of Geneva is the majority shareholder in the Geneva
freeport.17 Rather than managing it directly, the canton leases the
facility to a private firm that operates it.18 The cost of rental space in
the facility varies, but estimates range from approximately $1,000 for a
medium-sized painting to $5,000–$12,000 for a small room that can
accommodate multiple objects.19
The search for safe investments following the global financial crisis
and the subsequent surge in art collecting means that demand for
freeport space is high.20 Business is strong in Geneva, where the freeport
generates approximately CHF 10 million annually for the canton.21 In
2014, the freeport expanded to a new building, which provides an
additional “10,400 [square meters of] high security rental space” for
clients.22 The precise contents and value of the goods stored in the
Geneva warehouse are unknown, but reports estimate that
Switzerland’s freeports together house CHF 100 billion in property,
approximately 40% of which is art and antiques.23 New regulations
14. Free Ports, WITHERS WORLDWIDE,
http://www.withersworldwide.com/news-publications/free-ports--2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22F9-YRYW].
15. Free-ports, or the Elusive Treasure Chests of Art, PRIVATE ART INVESTOR
(Oct. 16, 2105), http://www.privateartinvestor.com/news/free-ports-or-the-
elusive-treasure-chests-of-art/ [https://perma.cc/YM5K-TVRT].
16. BOLL, supra note 13, at 64.
17. Über-Warehouses for the Ultra-Rich, ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21590353-ever-more-wealth-
being-parked-fancy-storage-facilities-some-customers-they-are
[https://perma.cc/HD8H-EAXU].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Message concernant la modification de la loi sur les douanes [Message
Concerning the Modification to the Law on Customs] Mar. 6, 2015, FF 2015
2657, 2667 (Switz.), available at https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-
gazette/2015/2657.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4RK-N649].
21. Free-ports, or the Elusive Treasure Chests of Art, supra note 15.
22. About Us: Company Milestones, GENEVA FREE PORTS &WAREHOUSES, LTD.,
http://geneva-freeports.ch/en/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/TE4X-S7DP].
23. Eichenberger, supra note 5.
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targeting the warehouses therefore have significant business interests at
stake.
Freeports are designed to reduce barriers to trade by decreasing
“the number of transactional events at which some customs or tax
might be collectable.”24 Because goods stored in freeports are
understood to be “in transit,” an owner defers all customs duties and
tax liabilities until the goods leave the warehouse.25 The freeports are
therefore “free” not only because of this deferral, but also because
owners pay no value-added taxes on goods sold within the warehouses.26
The tax advantages permitted by the freeports have “tend[ed] to
transform [them] into long-term holding zones,” where owners store
property indefinitely, and where it may change hands several times
without attracting a levy.27
Although numerous freeports exist globally, only the Geneva
freeport and five others—located in Singapore, Monaco, Beijing,
Luxemburg, and Delaware—specialize in storing works of art.28 These
facilities cater to collectors not only because they offer tax advantages
and deferred customs duties, but also because they provide tight
security and other art-related services.29 High-tech security measures
are a hallmark of these facilities, whose clientele include museums,
dealers, collectors, and art investors.30 The Geneva freeport reportedly
houses not only works of art, but also fine wine, precious metals, and
automobiles.31 Some dealers also operate galleries and showrooms in the
freeport to facilitate the financially advantageous intra-warehouse sales,
transforming the “temporary” storage site into a fixed retail space.32
24. Nicholas O’Donnell, Domestic Freeports Come to the U.S., PRIVATE ART
INVESTOR (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.privateartinvestor.com/owning-
art/domestic-freeports-come-to-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/NQT4-38K9].
25. Simon Bradley, The Discrete Bunkers of the Super Rich, SWISSINFO (July 9,
2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/the-discreet-bunkers-of-the-
super-rich/40474208 [https://perma.cc/7EMR-VEP2].
26. Id.
27. Free-ports, or the Elusive Treasure Chests of Art, supra note 15; Über-
Warehouses, supra note 17.
28. Free-ports, or the Elusive Treasure Chests of Art, supra note 15; DELAWARE
FREEPORT, http://www.delawarefreeport.com/ [https://perma.cc/EX3D-
NZW6] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
29. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
30. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
31. David Segal, Swiss Freeports are Home for a Growing Treasury of Art, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/business/swiss-
freeports-are-home-for-a-growing-treasury-of-art.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/6T6N-G4YB].
32. Id.
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Traditionally, the freeports have further catered to collectors by
offering discrete and confidential storage.33 The precise contents of the
warehouses are unknown, due in part to the limited reporting
requirements imposed on the warehouse managers.34 Since 2009, Swiss
law has required freeport mangers to maintain inventories of the
warehouse contents and the names of the individuals entitled to dispose
of the property.35 Customs officials also have the power to conduct
inspections.36 Yet neither measure facilitates meaningful disclosure:
warehouse officials only share records with customs officials upon
request, and customs officials have no obligation to share inventory
information with foreign authorities.37 As such, the freeports have
traditionally afforded collectors with a high degree of confidentiality,
requiring neither public disclosure of their identity nor the precise
details of their holdings.
2. Benefits of the Freeports for Legitimate Art-Market Actors
The Swiss freeports benefit two main types of legitimate art
collectors: those who wish to avoid the gratuitous risks of keeping
valuable property at home by seeking secret and secure storage, and
those who collect art for investment purposes.38
The first type of collector highlights the essential role that safe,
confidential art storage plays in the legitimate marketplace. Secrecy can
foster abuse, but it can also promote valid privacy objectives. In
banking, for instance, Switzerland and other secrecy jurisdictions justify
their practices in part based on the need to provide protections for
political dissenters and persecution victims, whose assets may be
confiscated by intolerant government regimes or other extortionists if
known.39 Discretion within the art market often benefits collectors for
comparatively mundane reasons, such as avoiding embarrassing
inquiries that might arise from the sale of a family heirloom in a time
33. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
34. Free-ports, or the Elusive Treasure Chests of Art, supra note 15.
35. LOI SUR LES DOUANES [LD] [Law on Customs] Mar. 18, 2005, SR 631.0, art.
66 (Switz.), available at https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-
compilation/20030370/index.html#app1 [https://perma.cc/E39S-PX7S];
Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
36. LD, supra note 35, at art. 62.
37. Free-ports, or the Elusive Treasure Chests of Art, supra note 15; Über-
Warehouses, supra note 17.
38. Segal, supra note 31.
39. MARY ALICE YOUNG, BANKING SECRECY AND OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS:
MONEY LAUNDERING AND OFFSHORE BANKING 135 (2013).
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of economic distress.40 Yet secrecy and discretion can protect art
collectors from the designs of criminals as well. Valuable collections
may be subject to undue risks of theft if kept at home, making private
and secure storage a prudent option.41 As one London dealer pointed
out, “most of the learned societies in this country do not publish a list
of their fellows or members . . . [b]ecause . . . such is the world that the
burglars or whoever say ‘oh, that’s handy.’”42 Keeping collections
confidential therefore helps to thwart loss at the hands of thieves.
Critics who question the need to protect collector confidentiality
often argue that collectors regularly compromise their own security by
publishing catalogues of their holdings.43 Although the practice may be
common, not all collectors choose to pursue it, suggesting that privacy
remains an essential commodity for many within the art market.
The second major category of legitimate collectors who benefit from
the freeport system are art investors. This “new species of collector”
often pursues lucrative opportunities in the rapidly expanding modern
and contemporary art market.44 As one collector has explained, “Monet
and Picasso are like Microsoft and Coca-Cola,” providing secure
investments akin to blue-chip stocks.45 In fact, some data suggests that
art and other collectibles have outperformed stocks since at least the
2008 market crash, contributing to the growing popularity of art
investments.46 At Art Basel, for example, “sharks” drawn to the
contemporary art market, which has seen surging prices in the last five
years, may speculate on a work by an emerging talent, store it in a tax-
40. S. R. M. MACKENZIE, GOING, GOING, GONE: REGULATING THE MARKET IN
ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES, 48 (2005).
41. Segal, supra note 31.
42. MACKENZIE, supra note 40, at 49.
43. MACKENZIE, supra note 40, at 50.
44. Mostafa Heddaya, Does the Art Market Need Regulation?, BLOUINARTINFO
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/1077893/does-the-
art-market-need-regulation [https://perma.cc/3DHQ-LN8K]; see also Daniel
Grant, Picture This Investment: Four Investing Pros Discuss the Risks and
Rewards of Buying Art, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2013, 4:01 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-sort-of-return-are-you-getting-above-
your-fireplace-1387056633?tesla=y [https://perma.cc/ZL93-HGWY]
(indicating that Old Mater and contemporary works rank among the most
profitable investments).
45. Susan Adams, The Art of the Deal, FORBES (Dec. 14, 2007, 7:20 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/global/2007/1224/076.html
[https://perma.cc/Z239-CP95].
46. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
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free environment until it appreciates, and then resell it for a profit.47
Freeport managers, well aware of the opportunities to support one-stop
shopping and duty-free storage in Switzerland, regularly attend fairs to
attract art-investor clients.48
Two main facets of the freeports—secrecy and financial
advantages—support the business models that art investors pursue.
Because stored works can be kept discretely and out of the public eye
for an unlimited period of time, investors can introduce “fresh” works
to the market that have not been shopped around or overexposed
among collectors.49 Freeports also allow investors to hold assets until
they are profitable enough to sell without incurring tax or other
financial liability along the way.50
Although the hospitable climate provided by the freeports allows
investors to grow their personal wealth, the storage sites also play a
role in promoting domestic tourism and charitable giving. For example,
owners who remove works from the Swiss freeports but keep the objects
in the country for public exhibition will suffer no adverse tax
consequences.51 In addition, works of art that remain on public view for
ten of the previous twenty years are exempted from inheritance taxes.52
Favorable art storage conditions and tax laws therefore work together
to bring works of art to Switzerland, show them publicly, and attract
tourists, all while continuing to stimulating private collecting.
To summarize, as one industry commentator has put it, “[t]here are
legitimate reasons for freeports to exist . . . [Their growth] matches the
growth of using objects as a store of value, as a reserve currency, they
are essentially physical banks.”53 In addition, the use of freeports “does
not necessarily portend illegal activities.”54 For speculators with “a very
clear intention of reselling, it’s better to try to avoid VAT [Value-
Added Tax] legally by putting it in a freeport.”55 When interest rates
are low and investors are looking for new ways to diversify, Swiss art
47. Heddaya, supra note 44; Jeremy Howell, Is the World’s Art Market Cooling
Down?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
35160416 [https://perma.cc/K8XC-6AB4].
48. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
49. See Adams, supra note 45 (describing how the Nahmad dynasty of dealers
slowly releases its inventory of works by major twentieth-century masters
from the Geneva freeport to stimulate market demand).
50. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
51. BOLL, supra note 13, at 61.
52. BOLL, supra note 13, at 61.
53. Heddaya, supra note 44.
54. Heddaya, supra note 44.
55. Heddaya, supra note 44.
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traders have strong incentives to maintain the climate that supports
collecting within the domestic market.56
III. Laundering Opportunities Made Possible By Swiss
Art-Market Opacity
The secrecy and financial advantages offered by the Swiss freeports
create conditions that contribute to the health of the domestic art
market. Yet the same conditions that support the activities of
legitimate collectors also present opportunities for criminal actors.57
In recent years, financial authorities have focused greater attention
on the art market as an ideal forum for laundering.58 Laundering refers
to the process of converting illegally-obtained assets—the proceeds of
crime—into legitimate ones. The art market in particular is “custom-
made” for laundering, as one reporter has observed, because “it is
unregulated [and] opaque,” meaning that buyers and sellers can conduct
transactions as anonymous “private collectors.”59 This opacity is further
enhanced by the fact that “many transactions are settled in cash or in
kind.”60
In 2010, Switzerland’s Financial Action Task Force issued a report
on laundering in the art market, finding that the freeports in particular
“present a unique money laundering and terrorist financing threat
because of their special status within jurisdictions as areas where certain
administrative and oversight procedures are reduced or eliminated in
order to boost economic growth through trade.”61 Two forms of
laundering in the art market, involving illicit antiquities and cash, merit
further explanation, as does the likely scope of the problems.
A. Laundering Illicit Antiquities
Since the mid-1990s, a string of incidents involving the Geneva
freeport has shed light on the methods used by criminals to launder art
56. Cynthia O’Murchu, Art: A Market Laid Bare, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 7,
2015, 7:49 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/a91a1608-d887-11e4-8a23-
00144feab7de.html#axzz42jarNSak [https://perma.cc/2VMB-U2BC].
57. Yan, supra note 6.
58. Reguly, supra note 7.
59. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
60. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
61. Financial Action Task Force, supra note 4, at ¶ 7. see also Ashley Fantz,
How ISIS Makes (and Takes) Money, CNN (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/world/how-isis-makes-money/index.html
[https://perma.cc/UJ3M-5XXK] (describing how ISIS maintains a “system
of profiteering from antiques thieving” and illustrating that the art market
can be used to fund terrorist activity).
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objects obtained on the black market, especially looted antiquities.62
The first major discovery of a laundering scheme managed within the
Geneva freeport came to light in 1995, when Swiss police raided the
storage unit belonging to the art dealer Giacomo Medici.63 Authorities
found around 3,000 antiquities that the dealer’s associates had illegally
excavated in Italy and smuggled over the Swiss border.64 In the freeport,
Medici attached a false provenance, or ownership history, to the
objects, often claiming that they belonged to an anonymous Swiss
private collection and that they were removed from Italy decades
earlier, before the periods covered by the international agreements on
the protection of cultural property.65 Based on this false history, Medici
secured legal Swiss export papers for the objects, which he regularly
sent to the United States for sale on the legitimate art market.66 There,
he arranged for “straw man” buyers to repurchase the objects on his
behalf and return them to Switzerland.67 This elaborate process gave
the works a documented provenance, effectively “laundering” them of
their black-market origins so that Medici could easily resell them to
unsuspecting collectors.68
In a similar incident in 2003, Geneva police discovered 200 ancient
Egyptian artifacts in the freeport that were found to have been illegally
exported to Switzerland.69 Following this discovery, Switzerland made
two important changes to control the illicit artifacts trade. First, in
2003, Switzerland became party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.70 Before joining the
Convention, Switzerland’s good-faith purchaser laws imposed high
62. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
63. Giacomo Medici, Cultural Heritage Resource (July 27, 2009, 6:08 PM),
https://web.stanford.edu/group/chr/drupal/ref/giacomo-medici
[https://perma.cc/V85E-FLFR].
64. Free-ports, or the Elusive Treasure Chests of Art, supra note 15 (clarifying
the ability of authorities to search the freeports; customs officers can conduct
inventory checks anytime, but Swiss police “need proof of theft or smuggling
before inspecting the warehouses.”).
65. A. J. G. TIJHUIS, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTOR: THE CASE OF THE ILLICIT ART TRADE AND
ANTIQUITIES TRADE, 201–02 (2006).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17; Free-ports, or the Elusive Treasure Chests
of Art, supra note 15.
70. TIJHUIS, supra note 65, at 202 (indicating that Switzerland joined the 1970
UNESCO Convention in 2003 and that its domestic legislation enacting the
Convention took effect in 2005).
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barriers on claimants seeking to restitute stolen works of art sold in the
country.71 Afterwards, under Switzerland’s Cultural Objects Transfer
Law, which implemented the UNESCO Convention, good-faith
purchaser rules changed to favor claimants.72 Secondly, Switzerland
introduced transparency into the freeport system by revising its
customs laws, which took effect in 2009. 73 These laws brought the
freeports into the customs territory for the first time (warehouse goods
“in transit” had previously been treated as foreign goods) but subjected
the facilities to a specific customs regime.74 The requirements imposed
by this regime include the duty of freeport managers to maintain
inventories that customs officers can inspect on request.75
Despite the introduction of additional safeguards, problems have
continued to arise. In 2010, Swiss customs officers discovered a Roman
sarcophagus in the Geneva freeport, which was identified as loot from
a site in southern Turkey.76 The incident illustrates how laundered
objects can evade the protections afforded by the international
agreements on cultural property.77 Customs inspections, when present,
often fail to detect the true nature of imported or exported goods. This
failure could stem from corruption, where customs officials accept
bribes in exchange for turning a blind eye, or simply from the difficulty
of recognizing an authentic antiquity that is being passed off as a fake.78
Perhaps more importantly, however, the post-2009 sarcophagus
discovery illustrates the limitations of a freeport regulatory system that
relies on customs oversight alone. The primary duty of customs officials
“is to make sure that goods don’t get into Switzerland,” not to keep
tabs on owner identities or other criteria that might help to thwart
laundering schemes.79
71. BOLL, supra note 13, at 64.
72. BOLL, supra note 13, at 64.
73. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17; Free-ports, or the Elusive Treasure Chests
of Art, supra note 15; LD, supra note 35, at arts. 62–67.
74. Caroline Stripp & Pierre Valentin, Free Ports, MARTINDALE (Apr. 20, 2010),
http://www.martindale.com/retail-trade/article_Withers-Bergman-LLP-
Withers-LLP_984644.htm [https://perma.cc/52CC-GVX5].
75. LD, supra note 35, at art. 66; ORDONNANCE SUR LES DOUANES [OD] [Ordinance
on Customs] Nov. 1, 2006, RS 631.01, art. 184 (Switz.), available at
https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/20052713/index.html#
[https://perma.cc/3HMP-CJCF] (elaborating on the requirements of LD, art.
66, to include key data points in the inventory, including an object’s country
of origin, measurements, value, and details on the person authorized to
dispose of it).
76. Bradley, supra note 25.
77. TIJHUIS, supra note 65, at 125.
78. TIJHUIS, supra note 65, at 125.
79. O’Murchu, supra note 56.
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B. Money Laundering
The freeport secrecy that benefitted Giacomo Medici and dealers
like him also provides opportunities for money launderers to conceal
the true origins of criminal proceeds. Although disclosure requirements
govern other trades, buyers and sellers in the art market regularly
conduct transactions as anonymous “private collectors.”80 As such, the
true origins of the cash and property exchanged are not always clear.81
Swiss officials are acutely aware of the growing international
concern over the potential for freeports to support the financial
operations of terrorist and illegal drug rings.82 Laundering schemes vary,
but the process could begin when an anonymous black-market buyer
purchases a work of art with criminal proceeds paid in cash, which is
common for art sales.83 The buyer could then store the object in the
freeports without disclosing her true identity, since she could simply
name an agent with the “authority to dispose of the work” on the
freeport inventory instead.84 To recover the investment, the black-
market actor could sell the object within the freeport, triggering no
duties or reporting requirements and preserving anonymity.85 Investing
“dirty” money in freeport collectibles also decreases the likelihood that
courts or other authorities will be able to locate, confiscate, or attach
the assets, since customs regulations permit the true beneficial owner
of the property to avoid being named on the warehouse inventory.86
Other potential money laundering opportunities in the freeports
involve art dealers who inflate prices, robbing innocent customers who
have no way of verifying the stated prices. For example, in 2015, the
billionaire Russian collector and Geneva freeport tenant Dmitry
Rybolovlev accused the art dealer Yves Bouvier, who formerly headed
the Geneva freeport management company, of grossly overcharging him
in a series of sales.87 In one transaction, Bouvier paid a private collector
$93.5 for an important Modigliani, which he then sold to Rybolovlev
80. Patricia Cohen, Valuable as Art, but Priceless as a Tool to Launder Money,
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013), http://nyti.ms/124yKiT
[https://perma.cc/3S9Q-J5ZC].
81. Id.
82. Financial Action Task Force, supra note 4, at ¶ 7; Bradley, supra note 25.
83. Yan, supra note 6.
84. LD, supra note 35, at art. 66.
85. Yan, supra note 6.
86. Yan, supra note 6; see also Message concernant la modification de la loi sur
les douanes, supra note 20, at 2668 (explaining that the 2016 customs
regulations now require the name of the property’s beneficial owner, even
though this requirement is easily skirted).
87. O’Murchu, supra note 56.
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for $118 million.88 Rybolovlev accused Bouvier of simply pocketing the
difference.89 Bouvier, for his part, claimed that he bought and sold
works for the best prices he could get, and that Rybolovlev himself
determined the fair-market value by accepting the costs.90 The dispute
highlights the pronounced opacity of the art market, where prices can
be raised and lowered at will and where buyers lack the normal
consumer protections available in regulated markets.91
The rise of art investing and the expanding tenant clientele of the
freeports have led anti-money laundering authorities like the Financial
Action Task Force to suggest that criminal activity may also increase.92
In addition, the non-profit Basel Institute on Governance reported in
2012 on “the high volume of illegal and suspicious transactions
involving art.”93 Concrete statistics on the amount of laundered money
invested in the freeports, however, remains scarce.94 Freeport mangers,
however, maintain that “the vast majority of their users are above
board” and caution that the desire for discretion in storage or financial
transactions should not automatically be confused with wrongdoing.95
IV. Switzerland’s New Art Market Regulations and
Possible Consequences for Honest Traders
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the extent of the laundering
activity in the freeports, Switzerland has introduced two new measures
to close the loopholes available to criminal actors. In general, the
requirements aim to increase transparency in art storage and sales,
reducing owner anonymity and increasing certainty over the legal origin
of the objects and the proceeds used to purchase them. In an official
statement, the Swiss legislature explained that it passed the new
regulations for two reasons: first, “to ensure the required transparency
towards domestic and foreign authorities on the stored goods”; and
second, to strengthen “Switzerland’s position in the fight against money
laundering.”96
88. O’Murchu, supra note 56.
89. O’Murchu, supra note 56.
90. O’Murchu, supra note 56.
91. Cohen, supra note 80.
92. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17; see generally Financial Action Task Force,
supra note 4.
93. Cohen, supra note 80.
94. Cohen, supra note 80.
95. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
96. Stacey Perman, Freeports in Freefall?, BARRON’S (Nov. 30, 2015, 10:29 AM),
http://blogs.barrons.com/penta/2015/11/30/freeports-in-freefall/
[https://perma.cc/YM2Q-5947].
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The new rules represent a preemptive strike by the Swiss legislature
to promote market transparency and curtail financial crimes. Other
recent financial regulations have tended to be reactive, sometimes
following embarrassing mistakes. For example, in 2009, Switzerland
settled a dispute between the United States and the United Bank of
Switzerland (“UBS”), where UBS admitted to advising American
clients on methods of avoiding U.S. tax liability.97 The settlement led
to the signing of a treaty between the IRS and the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration, requiring Swiss authorities to report directly to the IRS
on American Swiss-bank-account holders.98 Switzerland’s new
regulations targeting the domestic art market represent an outgrowth
of the broader crack-down on financial crimes. Yet the measures suggest
Switzerland’s new willingness to anticipate, rather than react to,
international concerns over laundering in an effort to repair its global
reputation.
A. Reporting Requirements on Art Purchases Could Chill Legitimate
Sales
Beginning January 1, 2016, the Swiss Anti-Money Laundering
Regulation will require the involvement of a financial intermediary,
such as a credit card company, in property transactions whose amount
exceeds CHF 100,000.99 Alternatively, the seller may perform due-
diligence investigations into the buyer’s funds in order to determine the
legitimacy of their origins. 100
The law aims to introduce greater transparency into transactions
over moveable property, including art, by providing traders with the
choice of one of two options. Under the first option, traders involve a
financial intermediary in their transaction, which eliminates the
anonymity that cash transactions permit and reduces opportunities for
launderers to conceal their identities.101 The credit card company or
bank used in the transaction obtains a record of the activity, which
97. Carrick Mollenkamp, UBS, U.S. Talk on Tax Case, WALL ST. J. (July 12,
2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124740851535228233.
98. Id.
99. Loi fédérale sur la mise en oeuvre des recommandations du Groupe d’action
financière, révisés en 2012 [Federal Law on the Implementation of the
Financial Action Task Force Recommendations, Revised in 2012] Dec. 12,
2014, FF 2014 9465, 9476, art. 9 (Switz.), available at
https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2014/9465.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FDX5-TZUJ].
100. Id. at 9476, art. 8; Hili Perlson, Switzerland Cracks Down on Art Market with
Tighter Anti Money Laundering Laws, ARTNET (June 2, 2015),
https://news.artnet.com/market/swiss-money-laundering-art-market-303976
[https://perma.cc/E3Y3-EBFD].
101. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
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enters the payment system and its mechanisms for detecting fraud.102
The second option allows the buyer and seller to keep their identities
and transaction confidential, as long as the seller takes steps to ensure
the legal origins of the buyer’s funds.103
Though intended to target laundering, Switzerland’s new law
threatens to punish innocent participants on the art market. Collectors
have many legitimate reasons to preserve their anonymity when
conducting art transactions, such as not alerting the public at large to
their wealth or purchasing activity in the name of safety.104 In addition,
the due-diligence obligations that Swiss dealers face when buyers and
sellers wish to avoid the payment system could result in higher costs
for all traders, since dealers could pass the expense onto their
customers. These costs, as well as the limitations on secrecy, may drive
collectors away from events such as Art Basel, and instead toward
competing markets—particularly those in Asia—which are subject to
fewer regulations.105 In its commentary on the new regulations, the
Swiss legislature recognized the growing competitive pressure on its
domestic freeports from those in Luxembourg, Singapore, and
elsewhere.106 Because many of these warehouses are controlled by Swiss
shareholders, the economic losses to Switzerland may be less severe.107
Yet the Swiss art trade has strong incentives for remaining an attractive
one-stop shop for art-fair purchases and duty-free storage, since these
offerings allow Swiss dealers to capture a fuller range of valuable market
opportunities.
B. Customs Requirements and Time Limits Also Inhibit the Legitimate
Art Market While Failing to Eliminate Laundering Opportunities
1. Background
In late 2015, the Swiss Parliament amended the Swiss Customs Act
to introduce additional measures to combat illegal activities in the
102. Lindsay Clark, How Banks are Detecting Credit Card Fraud, COMPUTER
WEEKLY, http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/How-banks-are-
detecting-credit-fraud [https://perma.cc/2MZR-CLE5] (last visited Mar. 13,
2016).
103. Loi fédérale, supra note 99, at 9476, art. 8.
104. Segal, supra note 31.
105. See Yan, supra note 6 (describing the minimal customs requirements imposed
on the Singapore freeport, whose tenants can satisfy inventory reporting
obligations using vague terms, such as “painting,” rather than more
descriptive indicators of an object’s true origin or worth, such as “Van
Gogh”).
106. Message concernant la modification de la loi sur les douanes, supra note 20,
at 2667.
107. Über-Warehouses, supra note 17.
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freeports.108 The legislation stems from a report issued in 2014 by the
Swiss Federal Audit Office, which made recommendations to
Parliament regarding the freeports.109 In its findings, the SFAO raised
particular concerns regarding the unlimited duration for storing
property in the freeports:
. . . the SFAO has found that several warehouses experience very
little movement of merchandise, meaning that goods are stored
for long periods of time, sometimes several decades. The function
of this type of customs warehouse is the management of private
or institutional assets and tax optimization for extremely valuable
merchandise (artworks, precious metals), which is not in line with
the main function of customs warehouses [as temporary storage
facilities for goods in transit], or the spirit of the law. Licenses
should only be granted for warehouses with regular movement of
merchandise. 110
These findings form the backdrop for the resulting legislation, which
uses inventory turn-over in the freeports as a tool to promote greater
transparency and reduce opportunities for crime.
2. The Rule
Starting January 1, 2016, the Swiss Customs Act will impose a six-
month time limit on goods stored in the freeports.111 The new rule
represents a dramatic shift away from the unlimited time periods that
tenants in the Swiss freeports have previously enjoyed. The law does,
however, permit the Swiss Federal Customs Administration to extend
the time limits on stored objects if it finds proper grounds.112 In
addition, the amendments to the Swiss Customs Act impose additional
requirements on the freeport managers, who have a duty to identify
beneficial owners in the warehouse inventory records, rather than
108. Art Media Agency, Switzerland Approves Stricter Regulations on Free Ports,
PRIVATE ART INVESTOR (Nov. 27, 2015),
http://www.privateartinvestor.com/owning-art/switzerland-approves-
stricter-regulations-on-free-ports/ [https://perma.cc/KGE2-X2Z9].
109. Swiss Federal Audit Office, Ports francs et entrepôts douaniers ouverts:
Evaluation des authorisations et des activités de contrôle, 14, CDF-12490
(Jan. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.efk.admin.ch/images/stories/efk_dokumente/publikationen/ev
aluationen/Evaluationen%20%2845%29/12490BE_Entrepots_douaniers_P
UBLICATION_RAPPORT_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/J96F-G43G].
110. Id.
111. OD, supra note 75, at art. 53.
112. OD, supra note 75, at art. 157 (indicating that supply-chain problems or the
non-conclusion of a sale contract constitute “proper grounds” for granting an
extension).
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simply the agents empowered to dispose of works of art.113 The
inventory-recording requirements also extend to additional forms of
property stored in the freeports, such as wine, furniture, cars, and
cigars, in order to curb the expansion of laundering activities into other
collecting areas.114
While the new regulations on art sales use due diligence and
financial intermediaries to improve transparency, the Customs Act
amendments aim to reduce secrecy in the art market by encouraging a
higher rate of inventory turnover. Tenants will have less freedom to
store works of art indefinitely, or at least face more administrative
hurdles to ensure long-term storage. As a result, unscrupulous dealers
may have fewer opportunities to hide illegally obtained objects from
customs authorities.115
The new time-limit and inventory-reporting regulations also
threaten to impose costs on innocent collectors who use the freeports.
The anonymity of honest traders wishing to limit their exposure to theft
or loss could be compromised in light of the duty of warehouse
managers to list beneficial owners in the inventory.116 In practice,
beneficial ownership is easily concealed by adopting pseudonyms or
using agents as stand-ins, but the requirement could be concerning to
some freeport tenants who place a premium on confidentiality. In
addition, the regulations could deter art investors from doing business
in Switzerland, since they require secure storage over long periods of
time to allow appreciation to occur.
C. Two Additional Problems: Punishing the Innocent and Racing to the
Bottom
Switzerland’s new laws aimed at dishonest art market participants
threaten to punish the innocent, who lose the security of confidential
art storage and opportunities to grow art investments over time. The
unintended consequences of Switzerland’s anti-laundering regulations
find an instructive parallel in the “de-risking” trend in banking.
Governmental efforts to close loopholes available to terrorist financiers
and other financial criminals have imposed new—and often costly—
113. Message concernant la modification de la loi sur les douanes, supra note 18,
at 2667.
114. Neuendorf, supra note 5.
115. OD, supra note 75, at art. 53; see also About Us: Company Profile, GENEVA
FREE PORTS & WAREHOUSES LTD, http://geneva-freeports.ch/en/
[https://perma.cc/7XHB-UA6T] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (indicating that
storage in the Geneva freeport “is not limited in time,” and that the six-
month time limits imposed under the revised customs laws may be extended
indefinitely).
116. Message concernant la modification de la loi sur les douanes, supra note 20,
at 2667.
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due-diligence obligations on banks to vet potential customers.117 Instead
of managing the risks and the associated costs, banks instead have
increasingly denied services to potential customers who live in
countries, such as Somalia, that have higher incidents of terrorist
activity and laundering.118 Innocent individuals who have no connection
to laundering, but who live in at-risk parts of the world, therefore lose
access to important financial services.119 Similarly, by closing the
loopholes available to art-market launderers, Switzerland threatens to
take vital aspects of its art storage services away from innocent
customers who have relied on the conditions of secrecy for protection.
By cracking down on laundering unilaterally, without a coordinated
international effort, Switzerland also creates anti-competitive
conditions for its freeports that may drive tenants to other, less
regulated markets. In response to the growing demand for secure art
storage in the wake of the art investment boom, newer warehouses in
Monaco, Beijing, and Delaware may have an incentive to retain
unlimited storage terms and confidentiality policies that favor
tenants.120 In comparison to the European markets in particular, the
Chinese art market enjoys comparatively lax regulations, which suggest
that innocent collectors—as well as launderers—may migrate to Asia
to avoid the disadvantages that Switzerland alone imposed.121 The
conditions create a “race to the bottom,” since the same laundering
problems that occur in Switzerland will proliferate in other locations.122
Laundering in the art market will continue on a global scale while
Switzerland loses its valuable share of the art market to jurisdictions
with fewer regulations.
117. Lanier Saperstein & Geoffrey Sant, Account Closed: How Bank ‘De-Risking’
Hurts Legitimate Costumers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/account-closed-how-bank-de-risking-hurts-
legitimate-customers-1439419093 [https://perma.cc/SFM7-QA68].
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Silke Koltrowitz & Paul Arnold, Freeports Boom Highlights Risks of Shady
Activities, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2016, 12:34 PM)
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-freeports-idUSKCN11S1OL
[https://perma.cc/MW4D-T5MD].
121. Reguly, supra note 7.
122. Thomas Christ & Claudia von Selle, Basel Art Trade Guidelines, BASEL INST.
ON GOVERNANCE (Jan. 2012),
https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/collective.localhost/files/publication
s/biog_working_paper_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/37BR-RHVZ] (arguing
that transactions refused by a regulated art-market actor will “be picked up
later by a competitor” who is not).
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V. Potential Solution: Art Market Self-Regulation
The new Swiss art-market regulations, having only recently taken
effect, are likely to remain a fixture for the foreseeable future.123 By
taking unilateral action against art-market laundering, however, the
Swiss legislature has complicated the landscape for honest art traders
and produced potentially anti-competitive market conditions that could
drive business elsewhere. To promote uniformity within the art market
and restore a level, competitive playing field, Swiss art dealers should
lead an effort among professional art dealers’ associations to adopt
industry-wide self-regulations. This solution promises to remove
incentives for scattershot governmental intervention while restricting
laundering and preserving secrecy for the honest.
Recently, some anti-laundering advocates and art traders have
made increasingly vocal calls to establish some form of global art-
market regulation. Among these advocates is the economist Nouriel
Roubini, who discussed the need to curb “tax avoidance and evasion”
and other “shady stuff” in the art trade at the 2015 World Economic
Forum in Davos.124 Roubini, who is also an art collector, provided few
details on what the regulation should look like. One commentator has
suggested that “[p]erhaps what [Roubini] is calling for is . . . an
administrative agency that will be tasked with overseeing transfers of
art.”125 Yet, particularly in America, “other Congressional priorities
[make this] . . . a stretch right now.”126 Instead, a more practical
approach for regulating the art market on an international scale is to
rely on industry self-regulations.127
A strategy of self-regulation within the art market offers certain
important advantages. By taking preemptive steps to adopt industry-
wide due-diligence procedures that combat money laundering and the
illicit art trade, the market can ward off governmental interventions
that reduce confidentiality.128 As one expert has observed, “[i]f the
[industry does not] self-regulate, eventually the state will come and
make the law, and the art trade will be worse off.”129
123. See, Eichenberger supra note 5 (discussing the regulations would take effect
in 2016 and impact all traders).
124. Heddaya, supra note 44.
125. Heddaya, supra note 44.
126. Heddaya, supra note 44.
127. Heddaya, supra note 44.
128. Eichenberger, supra note 5 (“There must be real regulation of the art market,
if only to protect the honest traders. The big players like Art Basel should
think about it, because, once the question of banking secrecy is resolved,
attention will turn to the art world and that will really hurt!”).
129. O’Murchu, supra note 56.
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Currently, the art market does self-regulate, albeit unevenly. Large
auction houses with resources and valuable reputations to protect have
adopted ethical codes that govern staff behavior. Sotheby’s, for
example, maintains a compliance department and publishes its Code of
Business Conduct and Ethics on its website.130 The auction house
encourages its staff to report “potentially illegal, unethical or
questionable conduct” by maintaining a 24-hour company hotline.131
Although not published online, Christie’s has adopted a comparable
code.132 Both auction houses carry out due-diligence on behalf of their
clients in order to verify the legality of transactions, but not all art
traders “have the means, or the appetite, to carry out” this research.133
Because Swiss traders face more restrictions than their
international competitors, they have an incentive to lead the way in
reintroducing uniformity into the market and correcting competitive
imbalances. Fortunately, Swiss dealers have a set of art-market self-
regulation guidelines that they can readily propose for adoption by
professional organizations and their members.134 These model
guidelines, published by the Basel Institute on Governance in 2012,
address the need for art dealers across the market to investigate the
identity of buyers and sellers in order to reduce laundering risks.135 This
approach balances the need to limit opportunities for illicit activity in
the market while protecting collector anonymity, since dealers perform
the due diligence rather than reporting to financial intermediaries. The
due-diligence policies in the model guidelines also address the need to
use best efforts to identify the true beneficial owner of an art object,
since an agent could be acting on behalf of a launderer.136 The guidelines
provide detailed instructions on performing due-diligence and how to
resolve doubts.137 The guidelines also address the conditions in which
130. Code of Business Conduct, SOTHEBY’S (Oct. 2015),
http://www.sothebys.com/content/dam/sothebys/PDFs/JC_1416483_Leg
al_Code%20of%20Conduct%20Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FSZ-JQ22];
Henry Little, Does the Art Market Need More Regulation?, APOLLO (June
29, 2015), http://www.apollo-magazine.com/does-the-art-market-need-more-
regulation/ [https://perma.cc/J52Q-5AHL].
131. Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, supra note 130.
132. Little, supra note 130.
133. O’Murchu, supra note 56.
134. About CINOA, CONFÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DES NÉGOCIANTS EN
OEUVRES D’ART [International Confederation of Art and Antique Dealers’
Associations], http://www.cinoa.org/index.pl?id=2197
[https://perma.cc/LR7X-J6NL] (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (claiming 5,000
dealers from 22 countries as members).
135. Christ & von Selle, supra note 122.
136. Christ & von Selle, supra note 122.
137. Christ & von Selle, supra note 122.
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dealers should disclose a trader’s identity to authorities in order to stop
illegal actors.138 By advocating for self-policing, Swiss art traders serve
their own competitive interests by unifying the art market and the due-
diligence obligations among traders. But in addition, uniform
regulations within the art trade offer a better chance of curbing
laundering internationally, since dishonest actors will have no
unregulated corners of the market to seek out and exploit.
VI. Conclusion
The Swiss art market provides numerous services that meet
important demands among different types of collectors. The freeports
in particular have traditionally afforded honest collectors with a secret
and secure climate that serves legitimate priorities. In the wake of
Switzerland’s regulations that target laundering in the art market,
dealers have powerful commercial incentives to unify regulations
worldwide and preserve their ability to offer valuable, confidential
services to their clientele.
138. Christ & von Selle, supra note 122.
